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Abstract
Triviality results threaten plausible principles governing our credence
in epistemic modal claims. This paper develops a new account of modal
credence which avoids triviality. On the resulting theory, probabilities
are assigned not to sets of worlds, but rather to sets of information state-
world pairs. The theory avoids triviality by giving up the principle that
rational credence is closed under conditionalization. A rational agent
can become irrational by conditionalizing on new evidence. In place
of conditionalization, the paper develops a new account of updating:
conditionalization with normalization.
1 Introduction
Ordinary language includes many claims that describe what the world is like: it
will rain later, the die will land on 6, etc. Rational agents have various attitudes
towards these descriptive claims. These include coarse-grained attitudes such as
belief and certainty. They also include fine-grained attitudes such as having a .2
credence that the die will land on 6.
But ordinary language also includes various claims that do not seem to
directly describe the way the world is, but instead convey something about our
epistemic relation to it. For example, we have conditional claims like if the die
is rolled, it will land on 6, as well as modal claims such as the die might land 6.
Ordinary agents adopt propositional attitudes toward these claims as well.
Moreover, it seems that an agent’s attitudes toward these claims should bear
some relation to her attitudes toward the descriptive claims. For example, if
an agent is certain that the die will land hands, she should also be certain that
the die must land heads. This paper develops systematic principles governing
the relationship between our attitudes towards descriptive and epistemic modal
claims.
The direct focus of this paper is a well studied puzzle about the probability
of epistemic modal claims. There are many controversial inferences involving
epistemic modals, including the Direct Argument (¬A ∨ B implies A → B),
Lukasiewicz’s principle (A implies A), and right nested Modus Ponens (A and
A→ (B→ C) imply B→ C). Each inference has a pair of puzzling properties:
the inference preserves certainty, but fails to preserve probability, so that a
rational agent can be less confident in the conclusion than the premises. But
these two properties seem incompatible.
This paper develops a theory of epistemic modal credence to resolve this
puzzle within an information sensitive semantics for epistemic modals, where
meanings are sets of information state-world pairs. We first develop a theory of
epistemic modal credence which provides a formal characterization of what it
takes for various inferences to preserve probability or preserve certainty. In order
to divorce these two properties, the resulting theory gives up the assumption
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that conditionalization preserves rationality: a rational agent may become
irrational if she conditionalized on a new piece of information. To give up this
assumption, we go on to develop a new method of updating: conditionalization
with normalization. When an agent learns a claim, she doesn’t just narrow
down her credence function to the state-world pairs at which the claim is true.
In addition, she must normalize her credence function, by removing any world
where the claim is false from any state she takes to be possible. With our
new update procedure in place, we go on to resolve the puzzle with which we
begin. The problematic inferences above are shown to preserve certainty but not
probability. To avoid triviality, the proposal rejects the principle that the set of
rational probability functions are closed under conditionalization upon evidence.
Rather, the set of rational probability functions is closed under the new update
procedure of conditionalization with normalization. In the final sections of the
paper, we explore a particular thesis about modal credence: that agents should
be maximally opinionated in modal claims, assigning any such claim a credence
of 0 or 1.
2 A puzzle about modal credence
Consider the inference in (1):
(1) a. Either the gardener or the butler did it.
b. Therefore, if the gardener didn’t do it, the butler did.
The inference in (1) is called ‘Or-to-If’, or ‘The Direct Argument’.1
(2) The Direct Argument. ¬A ∨ B |= A→ B
The reasoning seems impeccable. But the inference is also puzzling. Its validity
seems to require that the indicative conditional ¬A→ B is no stronger than the
material conditional A ∨ B. Given the validity of Modus Ponens, this in turn
implies that the indicative conditional and the material conditional are logically
equivalent.
As observed by Edgington 1995, Schulz 2017, and Santorio 2018a, the Direct
Argument is also puzzling from a probabilistic perspective. Consider a scenario
in which we have three suspects: butler, gardener, and cook. The gardener is
the most likely suspect, followed by the cook. By contrast, the butler loved his
master and so was very unlikely to commit the crime. In this case, the premise
(1-a) is very likely, while the conclusion (1-b) is very unlikely. This suggests that
the Direct Argument is invalid.
But now suppose that we discover that the cook possessed an airtight alibi.
In this setting, we are certain of the premise (1-a), and so the conclusion (1-b)
follows with certainty. In short, the Direct Argument preserves certainty, but
1For discussion, see Stalnaker 1975, Jackson 1987, Edgington 1995, Bennett 2003, and
Cariani 2018 among others.
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not probability. This is puzzling, since the former property suggests that the
Direct Argument is valid, while the latter suggests it is invalid.
Schulz 2010, Beddor and Goldstein 2018, and Santorio 2018a note that an
analogous paradox affects epistemic modal claims. Consider now:
(3) a. The house is empty.
b. Therefore, the house must be empty.
This inference is called Lukasiewicz’s principle.2
(4) Lukasiewicz’s Principle. A |= A
Its validity is controversial. As with the Direct Argument, this inference fails
to preserve probability. Suppose Ari the burglar has been casing the house
for hours. As far as she can tell, not a mouse is stirring. Consequently, Ari
believes the house is empty (or at least has a quite high credence). Still, Ari is an
experienced burglar; she knows that even the most thorough reconnaissance is
fallible. Thus she allows that there’s some possibility—albeit very remote—that
an inconspicuous resident is still inside. For this reason, she does not believe
that the house must be empty (and her credence in this claim is low). Here we
again have an inference where an agent’s credence in the premise is lower than
her credence in the conclusion. On the other hand, imagine that Ari became
certain of the premise (3-a), by accessing security footage of the interior. In this
case, she would also become certain of the conclusion (3-b).3
For a third example, let’s turn to instances of Modus Ponens containing right
nested conditionals. Suppose a fair six-sided die is about to roll:
(5) a. The die landed even.
b. If the die landed even, then if it didn’t land 2 or 4, it landed 6.
c. Therefore, if the die didn’t land 2 or 4, it landed 6.
Santorio 2018a observes that this case is a potential probabilistic counterexample
to Modus Ponens.
(6) Right Nested Modus Ponens. A,A→ (B→ C) |= B→ C
In this case, we have a fairly high credence in (5-a) and (5-b), but a low credence
in the conclusion (5-c). Again, this counterexample disappears under conditions
of certainty. If we become certain of (5-a), we will immediately become certain
of the conclusion (5-c).
We now have three examples of inferences which preserve rational certainty
but not rational credence. In each case, Santorio 2018a precisifies the puzzle
above by developing a triviality result, showing that if the inference above
preserves certainty, it must also preserve rational credence.
Let Pr be a probability function defined over a simple propositional language
2For initial discussion see Yalcin 2007.
3Here we abstract from the role of must in signaling indirect evidence. For more on this
feature of must, see for example von Fintel and Gillies 2010.
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enriched with the epistemic modals might and must, and the indicative condi-
tional. Above, we saw that three inferences concerning epistemic modals seem
to be certainty preserving for any rational agent’s credence function:
(7) Where Pr is a rational probability function:
a. If Pr(¬A ∨ B) = 1, then Pr(A→ B) = 1.
b. If Pr(A) = 1, then Pr(A) = 1.
c. If Pr(A ∧ (A→ (B→ C)) = 1, then Pr(B→ C) = 1.
Now assume that the class of rational credence functions is closed under condi-
tionalization, so that whenever a probability function is rational, the result of
conditionalizing it on a piece of evidence is also rational:
(8) Closure Under Conditionalization. If Pr is a rational probability
function, then Pr(· | A) is a rational credence function.
Given these assumptions, Santorio 2018a shows that each of the inferences above
is probability preserving.4 First consider the Direct Argument.
(9) a. Pr(A → B) = Pr(A → B | ¬A ∨ B) × Pr(¬A ∨ B) + Pr(A → B |
¬(¬A ∨ B))× Pr(¬(¬A ∨ B))
b. Pr(A→ B | ¬A ∨ B) = 1
c. Pr(A→ B) = Pr(¬A∨B)+Pr(A→ B | ¬(¬A∨B))×Pr(¬(¬A∨B))
d. So Pr(A→ B) ≥ Pr(¬A ∨ B)
We start with an application of the Law of Total Probability to some rational
probability function Pr: the probability of A → B is a weighted sum of its
probability conditional on ¬A∨B and ¬(¬A∨B), weighted by the prior probability
of ¬A ∨ B. But given Closure under Conditionalization, we know that Pr(· |
¬A ∨ B) is itself a rational probability function. Since Pr(¬A ∨ B | ¬A ∨ B) = 1,
we can infer that Pr(A → B | ¬A ∨ B) = 1 by the assumption that the Direct
Argument preserves certainty. But then applying the Law of Total Probability,
we know that the current probability of Pr(A → B) is Pr(¬A ∨ B) plus some
value. So the Direct Argument’s conclusion A→ B must have a probability at
least as high as the probability of its premise ¬A ∨ B.
Similar arguments show that Lukasiewicz’s Principle and Right Nested Modus
Ponens are probability preserving if they are certainty preserving.
(10) a. Pr(A) = Pr(A | A)× Pr(A) + Pr(A | ¬A)× Pr(¬A)
b. Pr(A | A) = 1
c. So Pr(A) ≥ Pr(A)
(11) a. Pr(B → C) = Pr(B → C | A ∧ (A → (B → C))) × Pr(A ∧ (A →
(B→ C))) + Pr(B→ C | ¬(A ∧ (A→ (B→ C))))× Pr(¬(A ∧ (A→
(B→ C))))
b. Pr(B→ C | A ∧ (A→ (B→ C))) = 1
c. So Pr(B→ C) ≥ Pr(A ∧ (A→ (B→ C)))
4For a generalization of this style of argument, see Santorio 2019.
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To solve these problems, we need to develop a general theory of epistemic modal
probability. The rest of this paper does exactly that, in a way that explains how
each of the inferences above can preserve certainty without preserving probability.
Crucially, the theory will reject the principle of Closure Under Conditionalization,
by developing a precise alternative to conditionalization.
The main goal of this paper is to develop an account of epistemic modal
credence that explains the puzzles above. But before continuing, it is worth
flagging another reason one might want such an account. Moss 2015 and Charlow
Forthcoming develop theories of epistemic modals that are designed to explain
failures of the automatic iteration of epistemic vocabulary. For example, following
Moss 2015, Charlow considers the following triad:
(12) a. It is probably the case that Trump might be impeached.
b. It is probably the case that Trump will be impeached.
c. Trump might be impeached.
Charlow suggests that (12-a) is weaker than (12-b) or (12-c), for example because
believing (12-b) licenses betting at fair odds that Trump will be impeached,
while believing (12-a) does not.
The goal of the current paper is to model directly how agents assign credences
to epistemic modal claims, rather than to provide a semantics for the probabilistic
language under which epistemic modals embed. Nonetheless, the data above
provides at least some reason to think that agents can have interesting degrees
of belief in epistemic modal claims.5 On the other hand, we’ll see below (in
sections 8 and 9) that one promising way of developing our theory requires that
epistemic claims always have a probability of 0 or 1, in which case sentences like
(12-a) would require further study.
3 Information sensitivity
In order to make sense of modal credence, we’ll help ourselves to an information
sensitive semantics for modal expressions.6 On this proposal, the meaning of any
sentence is not a set of worlds, but rather a set of pairs of information states and
worlds. While ordinary claims are sensitive to the world component of meaning,
modal claims are sensitive to the information state.
5Charlow Forthcoming differs from the current paper by offering a polymorphic semantics
for epistemic modals, on which epistemic modal claims are assigned semantic values of a
different type than ordinary claims. For this reason, the probability of an epistemic modal
claim cannot directly be compared with the probability of an ordinary claim. As a result,
Charlow Forthcoming does not model the kinds of substantive bridge principles connecting
these states that is the subject of this paper.
6There are several different kinds of information sensitive frameworks. For representative
work within update semantics, see Veltman 1996, Groenendijk et al. 1996, Beaver 2001, Gillies
2004, and Willer 2013, along with a technical appendix of this paper, where the information
sensitive semantics in the main text is compared to update semantics. For other information
sensitive accounts, see Yalcin 2007, Swanson 2011, Klinedinst and Rothschild 2012, Swanson
2012, Moss 2015, Yalcin 2015, Ninan 2016, and Mandelkern 2018. For useful overviews of the
literature, see von Fintel and Gillies 2007 and Willer 2015.
5
epistemic modal credence
We will interpret a propositional language enriched with three epistemic
modals: a possibility modal ♦, a necessity modal , and an indicative conditional
operator →.
Definition 1. L ::= p | ¬L | L ∧ L | L ∨ L | ♦L | L | L→ L
In Yalcin 2007, information states are represented as sets of possible worlds.
Then an interpretation function assigns each sentence a set of state-world pairs
as its meaning. We can then define s+ A, the update of state s with sentence A,
in terms of intersecting s with A, the set of state-world points where A is true.
Finally, A is supported by s, or true throughout it, just in case s = s + A, so
that A is true at 〈s, w〉 for every w ∈ s.
Definition 2.
1. W is a set of possible worlds which assign a truth value w(p) to each atomic
sentence p.
2. S = P(W ) is a set of information states, all subsets of W .
3. An interpretation function J·K assigns a set of pairs of information states and
worlds to every sentence in L.
4. A = {〈s, w〉 | JAKs,w = 1}
5. s + A = s + A = {w ∈ s | 〈s, w〉 ∈ A}
6. A is true throughout s (JAKs = 1) iff ∀w ∈ s : JAKs,w = 1.
The next step is to define our interpretation function. Atomic sentences like
it’s raining are true at an 〈s, w〉 pair if and only if they are true at w. The
negation ¬A is true at 〈s, w〉 iff A is false there. The conjunction A ∧ B is
true at 〈s, w〉 iff each conjunct is true there. The disjunction A ∨ B is true
at 〈s, w〉 iff either disjunct is true there. Epistemic modals are sensitive to
the information state parameter. Possibility and necessity modals existentially
and universally quantify over worlds in an information state. The indicative
conditional universally quantifiers over the worlds in the information that results
from updating with the antecedent.
Definition 3.
1. JpKs,w = 1 iff w(p) = 1
2. J¬AKs,w = 1 iff JAKs,w = 0
3. JA ∧ BKs,w = 1 iff JAKs,w = 1 and JBKs,w = 1
4. JA ∨ BKs,w = 1 iff JAKs,w = 1 or JBKs,w = 1
5. J♦AKs,w = 1 iff ∃v ∈ s : JAKs,v = 1
6. JAKs,w = 1 iff JAKs = 1
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7. JA→ BKs,w = 1 iff JBKs+A = 1
In order to apply this semantics to the puzzles about probability with which we
began, we must formulate a notion of entailment. Within this system, several
different notions are natural. First, one might define entailment as simple
preservation of truth: whenever a state-world pair makes the premises true, it
also makes the conclusion true. Second, one might restrict this definition to
state-world pairs that are proper, so that the world is itself a member of the
state. For example the inference from A to A does not preserve truth at all
state-world pairs; but it does preserve truth at proper points. Finally, one could
instead define entailment as preservation of truth at a state, so that whenever
every world in a state makes the premises true relative to that state, those worlds
also make the conclusion true relative to that state. Summarizing:
Definition 4.
1. A1, . . . ,An classically entail B (A1, . . . ,An c B) iff for every s, w, if JA1Ks,w =
1, . . . , and JAnKs,w = 1, then JBKs,w = 1.
2. A1, . . . ,An properly entail B (A1, . . . ,An p B) iff for every s, w where w ∈ s,
if JA1Ks,w = 1, . . . , and JAnKs,w = 1, then JBKs,w = 1.
3. A1, . . . ,An informationally entails B (A1, . . . ,An i B) iff for every s, if JA1Ks =
1, . . . , and JAnKs = 1, then JBKs = 1.
To illustrate these different notions of entailment, let’s return to our three data
points. Each one is an informational entailment but not a classical or proper
entailment.
Observation 1.
1. (a) ¬A ∨ B 6 c A→ B
(b) ¬A ∨ B 6 p A→ B
(c) ¬A ∨ B
i
A→ B
2. (a) A 6 c A
(b) A 6 p A
(c) A
i
A
3. (a) A,A→ (B→ C) 6 c B→ C
(b) A,A→ (B→ C) 6 p B→ C
(c) A,A→ (B→ C)
i
B→ C
For illustration, consider Lukasiewicz’s Principle. Let s = {w, v} with p true at w
and false at v. p is true at proper 〈s, w〉, but p is false there. So Lukasiewicz’s
Principle does not preserve truth at proper points. However, when A is true
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throughout s, A is true at every world in s, and so A is true throughout s as
well.
Our target principles are informationally valid but classically and properly
invalid. For this reason, Santorio 2018a suggests that informational validity
preserves certainty, while classical and proper validity preserves probability. The
rest of this paper develops exactly this suggestion, by showing how to assign
probability to epistemic modal claims.
4 Modal credence
The basic idea is simple. Instead of assigning probability to worlds alone, we
assign probability to state-world pairs. The probability of a claim, modal or
otherwise, is just the probability of the state-world pairs at which it is true.
We are about to develop a series of rational constraints on how an agent
should assign probabilities to sets of pairs of information states and worlds. One
natural question before beginning this task is what such probabilities even are.
What is it for an agent to assign credences to objects of this kind? Sections
8-10 of this paper develop one answer to this question. On that proposal, an
agent’s credences in sets of state-world pairs supervene on her credences in sets of
possible worlds. If we accept this claim, we can rely on any old understanding of
ordinary credence (say, as betting dispositions) to interpret credence in epistemic
modal claims.
On the other hand, much of what we say below is also compatible with the
thesis that an agent’s credences in sets of state-world pairs do not supervene on
her credences in sets of possible worlds. Indeed, the reductive account in §8-9
requires that any given agent assign credence to only one information state at a
time (although see §10 for a way of avoiding this commitment). Holding fixed
the semantics for epistemic modals we just reviewed, this requires that an agent’s
credences in epistemic modal claims are extreme. Those who wish to reject the
reductive account below must find another interpretation of what it is to assign
credences to sets of information state - world pairs. Here, one option would be
to rely on recent work in Charlow Forthcoming. To make sense of credence in
epistemic modal claims, Charlow suggests that rational agents have primitive
conditional preferences to act in certain ways given various epistemic modal
hypotheses. Rational agents can prefer to drink water from a lake if it must not
be infected; but can prefer not to drink the water if it might be infected. At any
rate, we now set aside questions of interpretation and return to our main task of
studying the rational constraints on epistemic modal credence.
To assign credences to information state-world pairs, we introduce the notion
of an epistemic space. An epistemic space is just a probability function defined
over state-world pairs.
Definition 5. E = 〈W ′, F ′, P r〉 is an epistemic space, where:
1. W ′ ⊆W is a set of worlds.
2. F ′ = P(W ′ ×P(W ′)) is the set of all state-world pairs constructed from W ′.
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3. (a) Pr is a probability measure over F ′.
(b) Pr(〈s, w〉) abbreviates Pr({〈s, w〉}).
(c) For any sentence A in L, Pr(A) abbreviates Pr(A).
We sometimes use W ′E , F
′
E , and PrE to abbreviate the W
′, F ′, and Pr component
of epistemic space E.
An epistemic space provides a measure over different state-world pairs. Given
such a measure, it will be important in what follows to extract a notion of a
state, world, or state-world pair being live. Given an epistemic space, the live
points in the space are those state-world pairs which the space assigns positive
probability. The live worlds in the space are exactly those assigned positive
probability by that space when paired with some state. The live states are those
assigned positive probability when paired with some world.7
Definition 6.
1. Live(E) = {〈s, w〉 | PrE(〈s, w〉) > 0} is the set of live points in E.
2. LiveWorlds(E) = {w | ∃s : 〈s, w〉 ∈ Live(E)} is the set of live worlds in E.
3. LiveStates(E) = {s | ∃w : 〈s, w〉 ∈ Live(E)} is the set of live states in E.
Throughout, we’ll illustrate the main ideas with a pair of working examples. In
the first example, the agent treats two incompatible states as live.
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E
state world PrE
red w 1/4
red v 1/4
blue u 1/4
blue z 1/4
Here, the agent distributes her credence over combinations of information states
and worlds. In particular, she considers w, v, u, and z to be the live worlds, and
considers red and blue to be the live states. One state implies B and one implies
¬B. Our agent is indifferent between which state and which world obtains;
her credences over various combinations of states and worlds is given by the
7Here we assume that an agent is certain of a claim (so that it holds at every live point)
iff her credence in that claim is 1. But there are a variety of counterexamples to this thesis
involving infinite partitions (see Ha´jek 2013). For example, imagine throwing an infinitely
small dart at the real number line between 0 and 1. The probability that the dart lands at
1
2
is 0. But an agent should treat this possibility as live, since she can’t be certain it won’t
obtain. To solve this problem, we could enrich our models that an epistemic space includes
not only a probability function PrE but also a set of live points LE where PrE(LE) = 1. Our
major results below could then be recast by systematically replacing Live(E) below, defined in
terms of PrE , with LE . For simplicity, we suppress this complication in what follows.
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stochastic truth table above. For example, her credence in B is equal to her
credence in {〈red, w〉, 〈red, v〉}, which is 12 . This is equal to her credence in B.
In our second example, the agent again treats two states as live; but now the
states overlap.
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E
state world PrE
red w 1/4
red v 1/4
teal w 1/4
teal u 1/4
In this example, our agent considers only w, v, and u to be the live worlds, and
considers red and teal to be the two live information states. One state implies B
and one implies A. Our agent is indifferent between which state obtains, but
not about the world. Since world w shows up in both red and teal, the agent is
twice as confident in w as she is in u or v.
Our second example illustrates a failure of Lukasiewicz’s Principle to pre-
serve probability. Here, Pr(A) = Pr({〈teal, w〉, 〈teal, u〉}) = Pr(〈teal, w〉) +
Pr(〈teal, u〉) = 14+ 14 = 12 . By contrast, Pr(A) = Pr({〈teal, w〉, 〈teal, u〉, 〈red, w〉}) =
Pr(〈teal, w〉) + Pr(〈teal, u〉) + Pr(〈red, w〉) = 14 + 14 + 14 = 34 . Similar examples
generate similar failures of the Direct Argument and Right Nested Modus Ponens
to preserve probability.
We have now generated an epistemic space where our three inferences of
interest fail to preserve probability. Our next task is to give a systematic theory
of when various epistemic spaces allow various notions of entailment to preserve
probability or certainty.
5 Credence and consequence
In this section, we’ll build on Santorio 2018a to establish three main connections
between credence and consequence. First, the framework above guarantees that
classical consequence preserves probability. Second, there is a well behaved
class of epistemic spaces on which proper consequences preserves probability.
Third, there is another well behaved class of epistemic spaces where informa-
tional consequence preserves certainty; but this last class is not closed under
conditionalization.
The first immediate result of the framework above is that classical consequence
preserves probability. Suppose that A classically implies B, and consider some
epistemic space E = 〈W,F, Pr〉. Then A ⊆ B. So every point in A assigned
probability by Pr is also in B. So Pr(A) ≤ Pr(B). The same observation
extends to the case of multiple premises. Here, let the uncertainty associated
with A be 1 minus the probability of A. Then an inference preserves probability
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iff the uncertainty of the conclusion never exceeds the sum of the uncertainty of
the premises.8 In the system above, classical consequence preserves probability.
Definition 7. Classical consequence preserves probability in E iff A1, . . . ,An c
B implies that 1− PrE(B) 6>
∑n
1 1− PrE(Ai).
Observation 2. Classical consequence preserves probability in every epistemic
space.
Proof. Suppose A1, . . . ,An c B. Then the conjunction A1 · · · ∧ . . .An c B, and
so B is true at every point at which the conjunction A1 · · · ∧ . . .An is true, and
so its probability must be at least as high as A1 · · · ∧ . . .An. But the probability
of A1 · · · ∧ . . .An must itself be no lower than the sum of the distance from 1 of
each conjunct.
The next natural question is whether proper consequence preserves probability.
Definition 8. Proper consequence preserves probability in E iff A1, . . . ,An p B
implies that 1− PrE(B) 6>
∑n
1 1− PrE(Ai).
There are epistemic spaces in which this fails. But only under one condition. Say
that 〈s, w〉 is proper just in case w ∈ s. Say that an epistemic space is proper
just in case every live point is proper.
Definition 9. E is proper iff 〈s, w〉 ∈ Live(E) only if w ∈ s.
Proper consequence corresponds to an epistemic space being proper.
Observation 3. Proper consequence preserves probability in E iff E is proper.
Proof. Suppose that E is not proper. Then there is some live 〈s, w〉 with w 6∈ s.
Now let A be true throughout s but false at w. Then since A ⊃ A is false at
〈s, w〉, Pr(¬(A ⊃ A)) > 0. But ¬(A ⊃ A) p ⊥, and yet PrE(⊥) = 0, and so
proper consequence doesn’t preserve probability in E.
Conversely, suppose that E is proper, and that A1, . . . ,An p B. Since E is
proper, PrE only assigns positive probability to 〈s, w〉 where w ∈ s. At all such
points where the premises are true, the conclusion is true; so proper consequence
preserves probability in E.
For illustration, consider the inference from A to A, which is classically invalid
but properly valid. Suppose the agent’s epistemic space is as follows:
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E
state world PrE
red w 1/4
red v 1/4
red u 1/2
8See Adams 1998 and Field 2015.
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Here, the agent assigns positive probability to the pair 〈red, u〉, even though u is
not included within red. In this model, the agent is certain of B, since she only
assigns positive credence to the state red. Nonetheless, her credence in B is only
1
2 . This is because she assigns
1
2 credence to the point 〈red, u〉. So this agent
does not treat proper consequence as probability preserving.
If we think that proper consequence does preserve the credence of rational
agents, then we can make propriety a constraint on rational credence functions.
On this proposal, an agent is rational only if her epistemic space is proper. (In an
appendix, we explore a method of encoding this requirement into the semantics
for any expression, in a way that provides further motivation for requiring that
any epistemic space be proper.)
For comparison with what follows, it’s worth noting that if we require the
class of rational epistemic spaces to be proper, we can still accept Closure Under
Conditionalization. The class of proper epistemic spaces is itself closed under
conditionalization on new pieces of evidence, so that whenever Pr is proper,
Pr(· | A) is guaranteed to also be proper. We’ll see in a moment that other
constraints are not compatible with Closure Under Conditionalization.
Now let’s turn to informational consequence. Our goal here is to develop
a constraint on epistemic spaces which ensures that information consequence
preserves certainty, so that whenever an agent is certain of the premises, she is
certain of the conclusion.
Definition 10. Informational consequence preserves certainty in E iff A1, . . . ,An i
B implies that if PrE(Ai) = 1 for every i ∈ n, then PrE(B) = 1.
This principle does not hold in every epistemic space. Instead, it requires
that the epistemic space be plentiful, so that whenever a state is live, every
world in the state is assigned positive credence when paired with the state.
Definition 11. E is plentiful just in case if s ∈ LiveStates(E), then ∀v ∈ s :
Pr(〈s, v〉) > 0.
Suppose that the agent has eliminated 〈s, w〉 as a possible state-world pair, with
w ∈ s. Then at best she considers s−w as a live state; not s itself. We can think
of this constraint as a level bridging principle, connecting an agent’s attitude
towards states with her attitude towards state-world pairs.
More precisely, preservation of information consequence turns out to be
equivalent to the conjunction of being proper and plentiful.9
Observation 4. Informational consequence preserves certainty in E iff E is
proper and plentiful.
Proof. Suppose E is proper and plentiful. Suppose A1, . . . ,An i B. Suppose
that PrE(Ai) = 1 for every i ∈ n. Then every live 〈s, w〉 is in JAiK for every
9Strictly speaking, this observation and the last one hold not of epistemic spaces but of
epistemic frames, which hold fixed an assignment of probability to state-world pairs but vary
the interpretation of atomic sentences. For simplicity in what follows, I omit this complexity
by assuming that every set of state-world pairs is the interpretation of some sentence.
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i ∈ n. Since E is plentiful, this implies that Ai is true throughout every live s
(since whenever s is live, 〈s, w〉 is live for all w ∈ s). So B is true throughout
every live s. Since E is proper, this implies that every live 〈s, w〉 is in JBK (since
〈s, w〉 is live only if w ∈ s.)
Suppose E is either not proper or not plentiful. We must show that in
either case informational consequence fails to preserve certainty. Now sup-
pose E is improper. Then there is some live 〈s, w〉 with w 6∈ s. Let JqK =
{〈s′, w′〉 | s′ ∈ LiveStates(E), w′ ∈ s′}, and let JpK = JqK ∪ {s, w}. p information-
ally entails q, since whenever p is true throughout s, q is too. Furthermore,
Pr(p) = 1. But Pr(q) = Pr(p) + Pr(〈s, w〉), and so Pr(q) 6= 1.
Now suppose E is not plentiful. Then there is a live s∗ where w ∈ s∗ and
〈s∗, w〉 is not live. Let X = {〈s, w〉 ∈ Live(E) | s 6= s∗}. Let Y = {〈s∗, w〉 | 〈s∗, w〉 ∈ Live(E)}.
Let JpK = X∪Y , and let JqK = X. p informationally implies q, since they are true
throughout the same states (LiveStates(E)− s∗). Pr(p) = 1, since JpK = Live(E).
But Pr(q) < 1, since Pr(Y ) > 0.
Santorio 2018a identifies the property of plenitude and introduces a class of
models where informational consequence preserves certainty. But the relevant
models all assign a probability of 1 to a single information state (a principle we
will critically explore and ultimately defend in the final section), and for this
reason Santorio 2018a does not establish a necessary condition for informational
consequence to preserve certainty.
We’ve now said enough to explain our general strategy for solving our initial
puzzle. We propose that every rational epistemic space is proper and plentiful.
For this reason, rational agents should treat inferences like the Direct Argument,
Lukasiewicz’s Principle, and Right Nested Modus Ponens as preserving certainty
but not probability.
To implement this strategy, however, we need to say something about the
triviality results from earlier. Here, we reject the principle of Closure Under
Conditionalization. The crucial observation is that this principle is incompatible
with our requirement that states be plentiful.
Observation 5. The set of plentiful epistemic spaces is not closed under condi-
tionalization.
To see the problem, let’s return to our first example.
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E
state world PrE
red w 1/4
red v 1/4
blue u 1/4
blue z 1/4
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E is a proper epistemic space. This space models an agent who has some
credence that A obtains, but has no credence that A obtains, since her credence
is concentrated on states that are agnostic with respect to A. Now imagine that
our agent conditionalizes on A, eliminating the points 〈red, v〉 and 〈blue, z〉. She
reaches the following space:
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E′
state world PrE′
red w 1/2
blue u 1/2
This new space E′ is not plentiful, because PrE′(A) = 1, but PrE′(A) =
PrE(A) = 12 . Since A informationally implies A by Lukasiewicz’ Principle,
this shows that E′ does not preserve information consequence.
We can’t require rational epistemic spaces to be plentiful while allowing that
Closure Under Conditionalization is a sufficient condition for rationality. For
take some rational agent whose space is plentiful. Given this space, we can find
some new piece of evidence A where conditionalizing on A will produce a new
epistemic space which is not plentiful. Closure Under Conditionalization then
predicts that the new epistemic space is rational, contradicting the requirement
to be plentiful.
Our theory rejects the principle that rational credence is closed under con-
ditionalization. Since we reject conditionalization as a rationality-preserving
update procedure, we need to supply an alternative. In the next section, we
do exactly this. We enrich conditionalization with a further ‘normalization’
operation that updates the live states in an epistemic space.
6 Updating
We now develop an update rule which rational agents are permitted to use, so
that if they are rational prior to updating, they remain rational afterwards. First,
we review why the ordinary rule of conditionalization is incompatible with the
requirement that informational credence preserves certainty. Then we develop an
alternative to ordinary conditionalization: conditionalization with normalization.
Let’s begin by considering conditionalization in more detail. On the standard
proposal, the credence function of an agent with epistemic space E after learning
A would be PrE(· | A), which assigns any claim B the ratio of PrE(A ∧ B) to
PrE(A).
Definition 12. E +C A = E +C A = 〈W ′E , F ′E , P rE(· | A)〉
Unfortunately, this theory of updating conflicts with our initial data. An agent
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can begin in a plentiful space which preserves informational consequence, and
then conditionalize on ordinary information to reach a new space which does not
preserve informational consequence. To see the problem, consider our running
example.
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E
state world PrE
red w 1/4
red v 1/4
blue u 1/4
blue z 1/4
This epistemic space is plentiful, since every world in red is assigned some
probability when paired with red, and likewise for blue. In this space, the agent
has some credence that A obtains, but has no credence that A obtains, since
her credence is concentrated on states that are agnostic with respect to A. Now
imagine that our agent conditionalizes on A. She reaches the following space:
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E +C A
state world PrE+CA
red w 1/2
blue u 1/2
E +C A is not plentiful. While red is a live state, the point 〈red, v〉 is not live. So
this space treats some states as live while excluding some ways that state could
be realized. For this reason, E+CA does not preserve informational consequence.
While PrE+CA(A) = 1, PrE+CA(A) = 0.
To solve this problem, we say that while E is a rational epistemic space,
E +C A is not. The class of rational epistemic spaces is not closed under condi-
tionalization. Instead, it is closed under a new update rule: conditionalization
with normalization. This update rule factorizes updating into parts: first condi-
tionalization, and then normalization. The problem with the example above is
that after the agent learns A, her live states stay exactly the same. Before and
after she learns A, she assigns credence to states that are agnostic with respect
to A. In her posterior state, the agent’s credence is no longer plentiful. She
treats some states as live which contain worlds that she does not treat as live.
To solve this problem, we model updating with A so that the agent first
conditionalizes her state on A, and then normalizes the resulting state. With
normalization, we allow the agent to replace defective states with plentiful
counterparts. More precisely, let s + E represent the idea of updating or
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normalizing s with the information in E, by narrowing down the state s to the
set s+ Live(E) of worlds w where 〈s, w〉 is live in E (recall that s+ A is the set
of worlds w in s where 〈s, w〉 ∈ A). To normalize a space E, we systematically
replace every live state s in E with its counterpart s + E, by distributing any
credence the agent assigned to arbitrary 〈s, w〉 to its counterpart 〈s+E,w〉. We
then enrich conditionalization with this second step of normalization:
Definition 13. Where E = 〈W ′, F ′, P r〉:
1. E +CN A = E +CN A = Norm(E +C A), where:
(a) Norm(E) = 〈W ′, F ′,Norm(Pr)〉
(b) s + E = s + Live(E) = {w ∈ s | 〈s, w〉 ∈ Live(E)}
(c) Norm(Pr)(〈s, w〉) =∑s′ Pr(〈s′, w〉) s = s′ + E
(d) Norm(Pr)(A) =
∑
〈s,w〉 Norm(Pr)(〈s, w〉) 〈s, w〉 ∈ A
To see this theory in action, start with our first example:
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E
state world PrE
red w 1/4
red v 1/4
blue u 1/4
blue z 1/4
We saw above that when we conditionalize E on A, we reach a space that is no
longer plentiful. For example, while 〈red, v〉 is assigned no probability, the space
still treats red as live:
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E +C A
state world PrE+CA
red w 1/2
blue u 1/2
To avoid this problem, we normalize this space E+CA to produce Norm(E+CA) =
E +CN A. When we normalize the space, we shrink each of red and blue down to
{w} and {u}, because for example w is the only world in s that receives positive
probability when paired with s.
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A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E +CN A
state world PrE+CNA
yellow w 1/2
purple u 1/2
In the resulting state, both A and A receive a probability of 1.
In our first example, the live states are a partition. Now consider a more
complex example:
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E
state world PrE
red w 1/4
red v 1/4
teal w 1/4
teal u 1/4
When we conditionalize E on A ∧ B, we produce the following state:
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E +C A ∧ B
state world PrE+CA∧B
teal w 1/2
red w 1/2
When normalizing, we map both red and teal to {w}, and move the probability
assigned to those previous states over to {w}.
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E +CN A ∧ B
state world PrE+CNA∧B
yellow w 1
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We’ve now explored how conditionalization with normalization treats a variety
of examples. Let’s now turn to some of its structural properties. First, we’ve
seen above that this update procedure respects informational consequence. This
is because for any epistemic space E, the result of applying conditionalization
with normalization is plentiful.
Observation 6. E +CN A is plentiful.
Conditionalization with normalization is a simple recipe for taking any state
and producing a plentiful state, which lets informational consequence preserve
certainty. On our official theory, the epistemic space of any rational agent is
plentiful. We now enrich this theory with the assumption that the class of
rational epistemic spaces is closed under conditionalization with normalization.
(13) Closure Under Conditionalization With Normalization. If E is
a rational epistemic space, then E +CN A is a rational epistemic space.
Observation 6 more than ensures that the two constraints of closure and being
plentiful are compatible.
Now let’s compare conditionalization with normalization with the ordinary
rule of conditionalization. The first thing to see is that the two rules deliver the
same verdicts regarding the probability of any non-modal sentence. After all,
conditionalization with normalization simply adds a second step of updating to
ordinary conditionalization: probabilities must be systematically shifted from
certain information states to others. But note that any non-modal sentence has
its probability controlled by the world component of any point. So when the
probability of 〈s, w〉 is shifted to 〈s + E,w〉, the probability of each non-modal
sentence stays the same. In this sense, our update rule is a conservative revision
of ordinary conditionalization.
There are several structural differences between conditionalization with
normalization and ordinary conditionalization. The first difference is that con-
ditionalization with normalization does not automatically preserve certainty.
Consider our first example again:
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E
state world PrE
red w 1/4
red v 1/4
blue u 1/4
blue z 1/4
Now consider the result of updating with A.
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A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E +CN A
state world PrE+CNA
yellow w 1/2
purple u 1/2
In E, the agent is certain of ♦¬A, since ♦¬A is true through both of her live
states red and blue. In addition, E treats A as possible. But in E +CN A, ♦¬A is
no longer certain.10
Definition 14. + is persistent iff PrE+CNA(B) = 1 whenever PrE(B) = 1 and
PrE(A) > 0.
Observation 7. +CN is not persistent.
The failure of persistence is a natural consequence of the nonmonotonicity of
updating. The live states of the posterior space are not a subset of the live states
of the prior space, but rather are the resulting of intersecting each live state
from the prior with the worlds where A is true.
In addition, +CN is not always successful: sometimes, there are claims that
are treated as possible, where learning them does not produce a state that is
certain of them.
Definition 15. + is successful iff PrE+A(A) = 1.
Observation 8. +CN is not successful.
To see this structural feature, consider the result of learning an epistemic
contradiction of the form A ∧ ♦¬A. Consider the simple example of red and
blue above. This epistemic contradiction, is true at 〈red, w〉 and 〈blue, u〉, since
red and blue both contain A and ¬A worlds. So ordinary conditionalization,
E +C A ∧ ♦¬A, produces the same state as E +C A. This is another failure
to respect informational consequence, since PrE+CA∧♦¬A(A ∧ ♦¬A) = 1 and
PrE+CA∧♦¬A(∅) = 0, even though A ∧ ♦¬A i ⊥.
By contrast, when we normalize the result of conditionalizing on A ∧ ♦¬A,
we avoid this prediction. The posterior probability of A ∧ ♦¬A is 0. This is
because when we normalize E +C A ∧ ♦¬A, we do not reach an absurd state.
Rather, we simply shrink our two states red and blue to remove worlds where
A is false. After updating with A ∧ ♦¬A, the posterior probability assigned to
this claim is 0, even though the resulting space is perfectly coherent. Summing
up, in our system epistemic contradictions can have a probability greater than 0
(but never a probability of 1). But updating with an epistemic contradiction is
10In this way our theory interacts with the impossibility results in Fuhrmann 1989 concerning
epistemic possibility.
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guaranteed to produce a state in which they have a probability of 0. In this way,
the system’s treatment of epistemic contradictions is analogous to the treatment
in Veltman 1996.11
7 Avoiding triviality
We’ve now enriched our theory of modal credence with an account of the norms
governing changes in learning. Our official theory is that the epistemic space of
any rational agent is proper and plentiful, and that the set of rational epistemic
spaces is closed under conditionalization with normalization. This theory predicts
that proper consequence preserves probability and informational consequence
preserves certainty.
To summarize the ideas in this paper, let’s walk through how our theory
deals with the triviality results with which we began. First, we can see that each
of our initial inferences preserves certainty.
(14) a. The Direct Argument. ¬A ∨ B |= A→ B
b. Lukasiewicz’s Principle. A |= A
c. Right Nested Modus Ponens. A,A→ (B→ C) |= B→ C
For illustration, consider the Direct Argument. Suppose an agent is certain
that either the gardener or the butler did it. Then at every live world in her
epistemic space, one of these suspects committed the crime. But then plenitude
ensures that at every world in every live state, either the gardener or the butler
did it. So when we restrict our attention to the worlds in a live state where the
gardener didn’t do it, we know that the butler did it throughout the resulting
state. So the agent is certain that the butler did it if the gardener didn’t.
Second, none of these inferences preserves probability. Consider an agent
where every live state contains worlds with three suspects: butler, gardener, and
cook. The agent’s credence that the butler did it if the gardener didn’t is 0. But
she can have a quite high credence that either the butler or the gardener did it,
as long as she has some credence that the cook did.
Now let’s turn to the resulting threat of triviality. For simplicity, let’s continue
focusing on the Direct Argument.
(15) a. Pr(A → B) = Pr(A → B | ¬A ∨ B) × Pr(¬A ∨ B) + Pr(A → B |
¬(¬A ∨ B))× Pr(¬(¬A ∨ B))
b. Pr(A→ B | ¬A ∨ B) = 1
c. Pr(A→ B) = Pr(¬A∨B)+Pr(A→ B | ¬(¬A∨B))×Pr(¬(¬A∨B))
d. So Pr(A→ B) ≥ Pr(¬A ∨ B)
Our theory accepts the first step of this argument. Since we’re assigning proba-
bility to sets of state-world pairs, we know that our probability functions satisfy
11On the other hand, we could also introduce a more dynamic meaning for conjunction,
on which A ∧ ♦¬A is false at every 〈s, w〉. In that case, we would predict that every agent’s
credence in that claim is 0.
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the ordinary rules of probability, even for modal claims.
To respond to this argument, we reject the second premise. We have no
guarantee that Pr(A → B | ¬A ∨ B) = 1. This is because not every epistemic
space is rationally permitted. Only plentiful ones are allowed. But we can
start with a probability function Pr that is plentiful, and then conditionalize on
¬A ∨ B to reach a state that is not plentiful. In this new state, informational
consequence doesn’t preserve certainty, and so Pr(A → B | ¬A ∨ B) 6= 1.
On the other hand, we do accept an analogue of the second premise for our
preferred rule of updating, conditionalization with normalization. We know
that if PrE is a rational credence function, then PrE+CN¬A∨B(A→ B) = 1. But
an analogue of our first premise which replaces conditional probabilities with
posterior probabilities after normalization fails.
Summarizing, our theory of modal credence explains the puzzle with which
we began. The first key idea is that various constraints on epistemic spaces allow
information consequence to preserve certainty while proper consequence preserves
probability. The second key idea is that the consistency of these ideas requires
us to give up the principle that rationality is preserved by conditionalization
on new evidence. Instead, the proper rationality preserving rule of updating is
conditionalization with normalization.
8 Transparency
So far, we’ve offered a series of constraints on credences in epistemic modals.
But we have not yet provided an interpretation of what it is for an agent to
have such credences. In order to provide such an interpretation, we turn to
a new question: can an agent have uncertainty about what information state
they occupy? We’ll see in the next section that if we do not allow this kind
of uncertainty, we can reduce credence in epistemic modal claims to ordinary
credence in possible worlds propositions.
Let’s call an epistemic space ‘transparent’ just in case it only treats one
information state as live.
Definition 16. E is transparent iff ∃s∀s′ : if s′ ∈ LiveStates(E), then s = s′.
When an agent’s credence is transparent, she is maximally opinionated about
modal matters. Each modal claim receives a probability of 1 or 0.
Observation 9. If E is transparent, then PrE(A) ∈ {0, 1} and PrE(A →
B) ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. Suppose E is transparent. Then there is some s which is the unique
live state in E. Either A (alternatively, A → B) is true throughout s, or
false throughout s. In the former case, PrE(A) = 1; in the latter case,
PrE(A) = 0.
Santorio 2018a develops a model of modal credence on which it is transparent.
Much of this paper’s task has been to extend that model to a more general
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setting in which transparency is not assumed. In this section, we’ll critically
explore the prospects for transparency. We’ll see that there are a variety of
reasons to accept transparency, although none are conclusive.
Let’s begin with an argument for modal opinionation. Suppose that I am
about to flip a fair coin. Now consider the following conditional:
(16) If I flip the coin, it will land heads.
When considering your credence in (16), there are two natural reactions. One
answer is 1/2, the conditional probability of heads given that the coin is flipped
(see for example Stalnaker 1970 and Adams 1998). But another answer is that
the probability of (16) is 0. After all, in this scenario we assign a credence of 1
to the following might conditional:
(17) If I flip the coin, it might land tails.
But it is natural to think that (16) and (17) are incompatible. Indeed, the
theory of modal credence defended above has the consequence that A→ ♦B and
A→ ¬B are probabilistically incompatible, since exactly one of these claims will
be true at each state.12
Let’s think more systematically now about whether our credence in condi-
tionals is always opinionated. To reach that result, let’s continue to assume that
the Direct Argument preserves certainty, so that:
(18) If Pr(B | A) = 1, then Pr(A→ B) = 1.
Now, building on the observation above, let’s add the further premise that
whenever an agent is not conditionally certain of B given A, she rejects the
conditional A→ B.
(19) If Pr(B | A) < 1, then Pr(A→ B) = 0.
Again, our argument for this relies on two more general principles about might
conditionals:
(20) a. If Pr(B | A) > 0, then Pr(A→ ♦B) = 1
b. Pr(A→ ♦¬B) + Pr(A→ B) = 1
These two principles entail (19). For suppose Pr(B | A) is less than 1. Then
Pr(¬B | A) is positive, and so the agent is certain of A → ♦¬B, and thereby
rejects A→ B entirely.
When we put together our two constraints on credence in conditionals, we
reach an opinionated theory. Our credence in a conditional A→ B is always 1
or 0, depending on whether or not our conditional credence in B given A is 1.
Now let’s turn from conditionals to modals. Again, we hold fixed that
Lukasiewicz’s Principle preserves certainty:
12But see Santorio 2018b, Santorio 2020 for an alternative theory of conditionals on which
these claims are not probabilistically incompatible, although they are informationally inconsis-
tent.
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(21) If Pr(A) = 1, then Pr(A) = 1.
But now consider a further principle governing epistemic possibility: whenever
the agent has some credence in A, she is certain of ♦A:
(22) If Pr(A) > 0, then Pr(♦A) = 1.
Principles of this kind have been studied for some time in connection with
impossibility results in Fuhrmann 1989:
Your epistemic state commits you to It might be that p iff it does not
commit you to ¬p. (Gillies 2006)
Finally, we assume as is standard that ♦A and A are probabilistically incom-
patible, so that any agent who is certain in ♦¬A will completely reject A. This
gives us the result that whenever Pr(A) is less than 1, Pr(A) is 0.
The principles we’ve explored above imply that agents are fully opinionated
on modal matters. It turns out that on the theory above, any proper, plentiful,
and transparent theory validates just these bridge principles:
Observation 10. If E is proper, plentiful, and transparent, then:
1. Pr(A→ B) =
{
1 if Pr(B | A) = 1
0 otherwise
2. Pr(A) =
{
1 if Pr(A) = 1
0 otherwise
3. Pr(♦A) =
{
1 if Pr(A) > 0
0 otherwise
The principles above imply that an agent’s credence in modal claims supervenes
on their credence in non-modal claims. Once we know an agent’s credence in A,
we know her credence in A and ♦A. Once we know her credence in B given A,
we know her credence in A→ B.13
9 Reduction
Transparent epistemic spaces allow us to validate substantive bridge principles
reducing modal credence to non-modal credence. A natural question at this
point is whether there is anything systematic to say about how transparent
epistemic spaces come about. What information state in particular should an
agent be certain of? Here, we can draw on previous work in Yalcin 2012, Beddor
13On the other hand, transparent theories do not imply that every sentence containing an
epistemic modal has a probability of 1 or 0. For example, when A has a probability of 1,
the probability of the conjunction A ∧ B is identical to the probability of B, which may lie
strictly between 0 and 1.
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and Goldstein 2018, and Goldstein 2017 to offer an answer. We now introduce
a construction ↑ which maps any ordinary probability function over worlds
into a corresponding transparent epistemic space, which assigns probability to
state-world pairs.
In particular, let’s introduce the notion of an agent’s proto epistemic space,
consisting of a set of possible worlds and a probability function defined over that
set. We might understand this probability function, for example, in terms of an
agent’s betting dispositions on non-modal claims.
Definition 17. A proto epistemic space U = 〈W ′, Cr〉, where:
1. W ′ ⊆W is a set of worlds.
2. (a) Cr is a probability measure over W ′.
(b) Cr(w) abbreviates Cr({w}).
3. LiveWorlds(U) = {w | CrU (w) > 0} is the set of live worlds in U .
Now we can introduce an operation ↑ which maps each proto epistemic space to a
unique epistemic space. Our construction starts from the observation that there
is a special information state consistent with the live worlds of U : LiveWorlds(U)
itself, the set of worlds assigned positive probability by U . Then the probability
PrE of any claim A is the probability that CrU assigns to the result of updating
this minimal information state LiveWorlds(U) with A. (Recall that s + A, the
result of updating state s with meaning A, is the set of worlds w in s where
〈s, w〉 ∈ A.)
Definition 18. E = ↑U iff:
1. WE = WU
2. FE = WU × P(WU )
3. PrE(A) = CrU (LiveWorlds(U) + A)
In other words, the construction above guarantees that PrE(A) = CrU ({w | 〈LiveWorlds(U), w〉 ∈ A}).
Here’s an example: consider the proto epistemic space U = 〈W,Cr〉, where
W is our earlier set {w, v, u, z} and Cr is indifferent over W .
world CrU
w 1/4
v 1/4
u 1/4
z 1/4
When we lift U with ↑, we reach a transparent space that assigns all probability
to the single weakest state consistent with the live worlds.
24
epistemic modal credence
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
↑U
state world Pr↑U
brown w 1/4
brown v 1/4
brown u 1/4
brown z 1/4
Now that we’ve illustrated our construction with an example, let’s turn to its
structural properties. Let’s begin with our main topic, the connection between
credence and consequence. The first observation is that our theory guarantees
that any constructed epistemic state is proper and plentiful. This means that our
construction is sufficient to solve our initial puzzle, so that proper consequence
preserves probability and informational consequence preserves certainty. In addi-
tion, we know that any constructed epistemic space is transparent: LiveWorlds(U)
is the unique state assigned positive probability.
Observation 11. If E = ↑U , then E is proper, plentiful, and transparent.
Proof. Suppose that E = ↑U . Then there is one live state in E: the set of live
worlds in U . To show that E is proper, take some arbitrary 〈s, w〉, live in E.
Since 〈s, w〉 is live in E, we know that w is a live world in U . This guarantees
that w ∈ s. To show that E is plentiful, again consider the unique live s in E.
For every world w in s, we know that 〈s, w〉 is live in E, since w is live in U .
To fully explain the triviality results with which we began, we introduced a new
update rule: conditionalization with normalization. To see our update rule at
work in a transparent setting, consider the following example, where the agent
is certain of red:
A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E
state world PrE
red w 1/2
red v 1/2
Now imagine that our agent updates on A. To do so, she first rules out the point
〈red, v〉, assigning 〈red, w〉 a probability of 1. But now her state is not plentiful.
To resolve this tension, the agent must shift her credence entirely from 〈red, w〉
to 〈{w}, w〉.
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A
¬A
B ¬B
w u
v z
E +CN A
state world PrE+CNA∧B
yellow w 1
At every time, a transparent agent treats a single state as live. But which state
is live depends on what she has learned. When she learns new information, she
flips from fully accepting one state to fully accepting another.
We can understand the same doxastic evolution again from the perspective
of our construction procedure. Now imagine that our agent begins with the
following proto epistemic space:
world CrU
w 1/2
v 1/2
When we apply ↑ to this proto epistemic space, we reach exactly the epistemic
space above, with an agent who is certain of the state red, but equally unsure
about w and v.
Likewise, consider the second epistemic space from above, E +CN A ∧ B. We
can think of this epistemic space as derived from ↑ by yet another proto epistemic
space:
world CrU ′
w 1
U and U ′ are related in a familiar way: we reach U ′ by conditionalizing CrU on
w, the unique world at which A ∧ B are true.
The point generalizes: suppose an epistemic space E is constructed from
a proto epistemic space U . Suppose we then update the epistemic space E
with some claim A using Conditionalization with Normalization. The resulting
epistemic space is just the one we reach by simply conditionalizing the probability
function in U on LiveWorlds(U) +A. (Again, LiveWorlds(U) +A is the set of live
worlds in U where A is true relative to the live worlds.)
Observation 12. Suppose E = ↑U . Then E+CNA = ↑〈WU , CrU (· | LiveWorlds(U)+
A)〉.
Proof. Let E∗ = ↑〈WU , CrU (· | LiveWorlds(U)+A)〉. We show that PrE+CNA(〈s, w〉) =
PrE∗(〈s, w〉) for arbitrary 〈s, w〉. Either s = LiveWorlds(U) + A or not. If not,
PrE∗(〈s, w〉) = 0 = PrE+CNA(〈s, w〉). Otherwise, we have PrE+CNA(〈LiveWorlds(U)+
A, w〉) = Norm(PrE(〈LiveWorlds(U) + A, w〉 | A) = PrE(〈LiveWorlds(U), w〉 |
A) = CrU (w | LiveWorlds(U) + A) = PrE∗(〈LiveWorlds(U) + A, w〉).
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This last result provides a powerful vindication of conditionalization with nor-
malization. Ultimately, we can think of this update rule as emerging naturally
out of more basic ingredients. Fundamentally, an agent is endowed with a
credence function over worlds. This credence function changes over time by
the familiar process of ordinary conditionalization. But at any time, an agent’s
doxastic perspective extends beyond her credence in worlds. Her credence in
worlds determines her broader outlook on modal matters via our construction
procedure. From the modal perspective, the agent doesn’t count as updating via
the rule of conditionalization alone. But from the worldly perspective, she does.
10 Transparency without opinionation
In the previous sections, we’ve explored the prospects for a transparent theory
of modal credence. The cost of such a theory is readily apparent: it requires
agents to be maximally opinionated about modal matters. But the benefits of
the theory are also powerful. First, the theory validates a variety of plausible
bridge principles connecting modal and non-modal credence. Second, the theory
allows us to reduce modal credence to non-modal credence, via our construction
procedure ↑. Finally, this construction procedure vindicates our update rule of
conditionalization with normalization: this rule is just what one would expect if
non-modal credence is updated via ordinary conditionalization.
A transparent theory of modal credence offers a simple philosophical reduction
of credence in state-world pairs: this state supervenes on our ordinary credence
over worlds, itself potentially reducible to behavioral dispositions of some kind of
other. If we reject transparency, further work remains to provide a philosophical
interpretation of credence in sets of pairs of information states and possible
worlds.
If we accept a transparent theory of modal credence, we need to explain why
agents do not always appear maximally opinionated about modal matters. One
option is to retain the theory of modal credence above, but offer a new semantics
for epistemic modals. Following Goldstein 2018, we can let the meaning of an
epistemic modal claim be sensitive to both the world and information state
parameter, so that modal claims can be true at some worlds and false at others.
Then even an agent who is certain of the information state could still be agnostic
about modal matters, as long as some modal claim is true at some live worlds
and false at others. Such a theory would invalidate the specific bridge principles
between modal and non-modal credence in §8, which encode opinionation. But
the theory could still embrace the construction procedure above, so that modal
credence is still reducible to and supervenient on non-modal credence. To solve
our initial puzzles, any such theory would still need to guarantee that inferences
like the Direct Argument are still informationally valid (see Goldstein 2018 for
characterizations of the informational validity of these inferences within a world
and information sensitive semantics).
For example, one option explored in Goldstein 2018 is that epistemic modali-
ties quantify over worlds determined by a classical accessibility relation that is
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appropriately restricted to the current information state. So let Rw represent
the epistemic possibilities at w according to relation R. Rw might for example
be the worlds consistent with what is known by a contextually salient group.
Then:
Definition 19.
1. J♦AKs,w = 1 iff ∃v ∈ Rw ∩ s : JAKRw∩s,v = 1
2. JAKs,w = 1 iff JAKRw∩s = 1
3. JA→ BKs,w = 1 iff JBK(Rw∩s)+A = 1
To deal with our initial data, this semantics can be combined with an epistemology
on which rational agents are proper, plentiful, and transparent. On the resulting
theory, the agent always assigns all of her credence to a single information
state, and the agent’s epistemic modal credence supervenes on her credences
in ordinary claims. Yet the agent may not be maximally opinionated about
epistemic modal claims, because a claim can be true at an information state
and one world, while false at that information state when paired with a different
world. This strategy for dealing with epistemic modals differs from Moss 2015
and Charlow Forthcoming, who instead model epistemic modal ignorance by
assigning epistemic modal claims semantic values at a higher type than sets of
information state-world pairs.
11 Conclusion
We close with one open question for our theory: the probability of conditionals.
The framework above successfully predicts that when the conditional probability
of B given A is 1, the probability of the conditional is 1. This follows from
the Direct Argument preserving certainty. However, the theory above does not
validate Stalnaker’s Thesis when the probability of the conditional is non-extreme.
That is, we do not have the general result that Pr(A→ B) = Pr(B | A).
This is not an artifact of the system above.14 In the semantics above, the
conditional is strict. Relative to all our notions of consequence, we have that
A → C implies (A ∧ B) → C. But no such conditional can satisfy Stalnaker’s
Thesis while allowing classical or proper consequence to preserve probability.
The problem is that conditional probability itself is non-monotonic. We can
have Pr(C | A) > Pr(C | (A ∧ B)), even though the preservation of classical
consequence for the strict conditional implies that Pr(A→ C) ≤ Pr((A ∧ B)→
C).
The upshot is that if we want to extend our theory to validate Stalnaker’s
Thesis, we need to give up the strict semantics for the conditional. In this way,
the original triviality results in Lewis 1976 are more powerful than the triviality
results we have focused on in this paper. A sequel to this paper, Goldstein and
14Thanks to Paolo Santorio for help here.
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Santorio 2020 pursues exactly this strategy. The sequel develops an enrichment
of information sensitive semantics on which meanings are sets of paths, and
paths are linear orderings of possible worlds (as in Santorio 2018b). All of the
ideas from this paper can be transposed to that richer setting in a way that
preserves the results above while validating Stalnaker’s Thesis with a variably
strict conditional semantics.15
15Thanks to Paolo Santorio, and the fourth Taiwan Metaphysics Colloquium.
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Appendix: propriety
This appendix explores another way to motivate propriety as a constraint on
epistemic spaces. In particular, we will modify our semantics so that the meaning
of every sentence in L is itself proper, in that 〈s, w〉 ∈ JAK only if w ∈ s. This
proposal is not arbitrary. Consider the update semantics in Veltman 1996,
where [·] is a function from information states to information states, so that
s[A] represents the result of updating state s with sentence A. To update s
with an atomic sentence like it’s raining, we remove any world from s where it
isn’t raining. To update s with ¬A, we remove from s any world that survives
update with A. To update s with A ∧ B and A ∨ B, we explore the result of
updating with A and updating with B, either intersecting or unioning the two
states. Then the meaning of ♦A, A, and A→ B are tests, exploring whether
the initial information state is consistent with A, implies A, or implies B after
updating with A. In each case, failure of the test produces the absurd state,
while passing the test produces the initial state.
Definition 20.
1. s[p] = {w ∈ s | w(p) = 1}
2. s[¬A] = {w ∈ s | w 6∈ s[A]}
3. s[A ∧ B] = s[A] ∩ s[B]
4. s[A ∨ B] = s[A] ∪ s[B]
5. s[♦A] = {w ∈ s | s[A] 6= ∅}
6. s[A] = {w ∈ s | s[A] = s}
7. s[A→ B] = {w ∈ s | s[A][B] = s[A]}
At first glance, the semantics above seems to encode similar ideas about epistemic
modals to the information sensitive semantics earlier, but in a different framework.
As a matter of fact, the two systems are closer than they first appear. Given
any function [A] from states to states [A], we can construct an ‘uncurried’ set of
state-world pairs JAK, where 〈s, w〉 is in JAK if and only if w survives an update
of s with [A].16
Definition 21. Where A is a function of type 〈〈s, t〉, 〈s, t〉〉, let A = {〈s, w〉 |
w ∈ A(s)}.
When we systematically uncurry Definition 20, we reach a variant of the infor-
mation sensitive semantics from earlier:
Definition 22.
1. JpKs,w = 1 iff w ∈ s & w(p) = 1
16See Schroeder 2015 and Rothschild 2017 for similar thoughts.
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2. J¬AKs,w = 1 iff w ∈ s & JAKs,w = 0
3. JA ∧ BKs,w = 1 iff w ∈ s & JAKs,w = 1 & JBKs,w = 1
4. JA ∨ BKs,w = 1 iff w ∈ s & (JAKs,w = 1 or JBKs,w = 1
5. J♦AKs,w = 1 iff w ∈ s & ∃v ∈ s : JAKs,v = 1
6. JAKs,w = 1 iff w ∈ s & JAKs = 1
7. JA→ BKs,w = 1 iff w ∈ s & JBKs+A = 1
Observation 13. ∀A ∈ L : [A] = JAK
This semantics is just like the earlier one, except that it systematically strengthens
the meaning of each sentence to include a requirement that w is in s. Imagine
enriching the object language with a single proposition Proper, true at 〈s, w〉
iff w ∈ s. Then any sentence A in this semantics has the same meaning as the
sentence A ∧ Proper in our earlier semantics.
Observation 14. If 〈s, w〉 ∈ JAK, then w ∈ s.
To see the difference between this semantics and our earlier one, consider again
the inference from A to A. We saw that in our earlier semantics, this inference
was classically invalid, because A could be true at an improper point 〈{w}, v〉
with A true at w and false at v. Our new semantics makes A false at such
improper points, and so predicts that A classically implies A. More generally,
an inference is classically and properly valid on our new semantics if and only if
it was properly valid on our old semantics.
This new semantics provides a stronger motivation for imposing propriety
as a constraint on epistemic spaces. For suppose we do not. Then Pr(A ∨ ¬A)
may be less than 1. After all, A ∨ ¬A is only true at proper points; but if E
is improper than PrE will assign positive probability to some improper points,
where A ∨ ¬A is false.
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